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Abstract: Water resource development has always been considered as a strategic tool by the Turkish
ruling elites to reach food and energy security, as well as to enhance domestic peace and stability
since the foundation of the Republic of Turkey. Therefore, the concept of “hydraulic mission” fits
this strategic understanding, and it has become a prevailing paradigm in Turkey’s water resource
development. Many academic works have already been conducted to understand how Turkey has
waged an ambitious hydraulic mission by securitizing its water resource development primarily on
economic and political bases. However, fewer studies have shown how the Turkish ruling elites have
also considered Turkey’s extensive hydraulic development, sanctioned by the hydraulic mission, as a
foreign policy tool to enhance its influence at the international level. Drawing primarily upon the
concept of opportunitisation and the body of literature that looks at, albeit indirectly, the international
aspect of the hydraulic mission, this study fills this gap in the literature by looking at three case studies:
The Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP), the Water Export Initiatives to the Middle East, and the
Water Transfer Project to Cyprus, namely the Peace Water Project. Being informed by an in-depth
investigation of those three case studies, this study argues that ambitious hydraulic development
projects conducted by the Turkish government do not only serve to keep peace and stability at the
domestic level, but they are also strategic tools to enhance Turkey’s influence abroad. However,
this study also shows the limits of Turkey’s hydraulic mission abroad. While Turkey promotes
those water initiatives as tools for improving regional peace and stability, they are challenged by the
recipient countries on social, economic, and political bases.
Keywords: hydraulic mission; Turkey; water diplomacy; water conflict; Middle East
1. Introduction
Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, the founder of the Republic of Turkey, once famously stated, “peace at
home, peace abroad”, which has become the leading motto of the Republic of Turkey.
However, rarely Turkey has enjoyed peace and political stability at the domestic level since its
foundation. At the international level, Turkey has often had tense relations with its neighbours such as
Greece, Syria. In fact, considering the current situation, the conflict with the PKK, the involvement
in the Syrian Civil War (The Euphrates Shield and Olive Branch), the motto represents an ideal.
Nevertheless, the motto formalizes Turkey’s general view on domestic and international matters.
This article shows that the same notion can be applied to Turkey’s hydraulic mission. Here,
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the hydraulic mission can be defined as states’ strong conviction to utilize every single drop of water
by building hydraulic infrastructures [1] (p.75). The definition implies that the hydraulic mission and
the related concepts of water nationalism and securitization are discursive processes that occur at the
domestic level. However, is there an international dimension of hydraulic mission? If yes, how can it
be conceptualized? This article argues that the Turkish ruling elites do not only consider water resource
development as a strategic tool to maintain peace and stability—even with aggressive means in order
to secure their control on the territory and on the society through water resource development—at
the domestic level, but they also consider it as a strategic foreign policy tool to enhance Turkey’s
regional influence. This study finds that while the domestic and quasi-domestic projects, which are
conducted unilaterally, were successfully realized, the international ones, which required collaboration
with the neighbouring states, have failed. The study considers three empirical case studies to show
the international dimension of Turkey’s hydraulic mission: the GAP and its international dimension,
the water export initiatives from Turkey to the Middle East, and water transfer project from Turkey to
Cyprus (also labelled as the Peace Water Project).
The internal dimension of the hydraulic mission has been largely researched in the literature
analysing a variety of case studies across the world [2–5]. Concerning the Turkish case, previous
research has examined the central tenets of Turkey’s hydraulic mission at the domestic level [6–8].
This article builds on initial studies on the relation between domestic hydraulic mission and its
implication for transboundary water governance. In fact, initial studies argued that domestic dynamics
that are strongly informed by the hydraulic mission and securitization often led unilateralism in
the transboundary water contexts which corollary led to water conflict at the inter-state level [9,10].
For instance, Menga and Mirumachi show how water resource development is portrayed as a symbol
of self-determination and how it enhances states’ soft power at the transboundary level [11]. In a
similar vein, Menga also argues that states tend to consider their hydraulic development as a foreign
policy matter [12]. Hussein and Grandi [13,14] show the necessity of considering the broader context in
order to understand why hydraulic projects are successful or not; while Hussein argued that hydraulic
projects on transboundary basins are successful when aligned with the geopolitical interests of the
riparian states [15].
The structure of this article will be as follows. First, this article provides a critical review of the
literature on the hydraulic mission, focusing on the international dimension of hydraulic mission.
Second, it analyses three case studies: the international aspect of the GAP, Turkey’s water export
initiatives to the Middle East, and the recent water transfer project to Cyprus. Third, after briefly
summarizing Turkey’s water initiatives beyond its borders, it discusses the limitations of Turkey’s
hydraulic mission abroad.
The methodology adopted in this article is qualitative. The methods of data collection deployed
to shed light on the hydraulic mission of Turkey nationally and internationally are: documentation and
interviews with the key informants that have appeared in the media outlets. Specifically, interviews
conducted with policy makers; their statements and speeches made by the politicians constituted the
backbone of the study.
2. Understanding the Domestic and International Aspects of the Hydraulic Mission
This section reviews the concept the hydraulic mission in the literature, and the role that it plays
in states’ domestic influence. While the focus of the literature has been on the hydraulic mission at
home, and on how they can increase their power and influence in their country, the second part of
this reviews aims at discussing the state of the art in the literature concerning the hydraulic mission
abroad. These concepts will then be applied to the Turkish case study in Section 3.
2.1. The Brief Review of the Hydraulic Mission and Its Role in States’ Domestic Influence
The concept of hydraulic mission is defined as “the strong conviction that every drop of water
flowing to the ocean is a waste and that the state should develop hydraulic infrastructure to capture as
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much water as possible for human uses” [5] (p. 10). As understood from this definition, “hydraulic
mission” refers to a paradigm change regarding issues related to water resource development,
management, and ownership. Since the period of industrialization, the state control over water
resources has significantly increased. Thanks to the development in technology, it has become possible
for states to conduct extensive hydraulic development works to be able to control water resources
thereby controlling nature and utilizing water resources as much as possible for human uses [9].
However, Wester’s definition partly explains how the hydraulic mission serves as a tool to justify their
extensive hydraulic development projects. The main problem with Wester’s definition is that it does not
explain why states seek to develop extensive hydraulic development projects justified and legitimized
through the hydraulic mission. In this regard, Turton and Meissner provide a more comprehensive
definition of hydraulic mission. Accordingly, they define hydraulic mission as “the overarching
rationale that underpins the state’s desire to establish conditions that are conducive to socioeconomic
and political stability. As such it can be regarded as a form of ideology in the study of hydropolitics,
infusing itself into the dominant or sanctioned discourse, serving to legitimize (and thereby sanction)
this discourse” [16] (p. 38). The definition implies that state elites impose the hydraulic mission as
a prevailing paradigm to enhance states’ political, economic, and symbolic power. Here, enhancing
states’ political, economic and symbolic power is strongly related to state making that refers to “states’
ability to accumulate power” [17] (p. 29); and nation-building that refers to “set of policies aimed at
creating a common identity and sense of patriotism and loyalty toward the state” [18] (p. 488). Thus,
in his seminal thesis, the Water Nationalism, Allouche [9] shows how state making and nation-building
processes are inherently related to extensive hydraulic development led by the state. In this regard,
the hydraulic mission informs water nationalism. In other words, discourses promoted by the state
elites in the context of the hydraulic mission constitutes the main discursive component of states’
water nationalisms. Therefore, in the more recent study concerning Egyptian water nationalism in the
context of the Nile basin, Hanna and Allouche [19] (p. 91) label water nationalism conducted by the
states as “national hydraulic missions at the domestic scale.” Concerning the link between symbolic
power and hydraulic mission, there are essentially two components. First, the idea that wild nature
must be harnessed for the benefit of humankind is promoted by discursive elites in the context of
hydraulic mission. For instance, in the inaugural ceremony of the Hoover Dam in the United States
(US), president Roosevelt stated “pridefully, man acclaims his conquest of nature” [20] (p. 219).
Likewise, the extensive hydraulic development conducted by the State Hydraulic Works
(DSI-Turkish acronym) is considered as “a battle between the steppe and the green” [21] (p. 19).
Similar discourses that show the human enthusiasm to control and harness nature can be found in
different contexts across the world. The discourses such as “to make the made rivers sane” [22] (p. 17);
War against nature”, “to tame and domesticate rivers” [23] (p. 111); can be considered as typical
examples. The second component is the idea that an entire water potential of any given watershed
must be utilized for human needs. According to this view, any water that flows to the sea without
being utilized is a wasted water [24]. Thanks to the technological advances in the 20th century, states
are able to utilize the entire watershed, including mainstream rivers, its tributaries, groundwater
resources, and so on. This idea of harnessing the watershed in its entirety was materialized for the
first time when the US government founded the Tennessee Valley Authority (TVA) in 1932. The TVA
model was also applied across the country, after which it was cloned across the world primarily by
developing nations [25]. The TVA model is considered as an effective tool to tackle socio-economic
problems at the local level.
Second, discursive elites often portray large-scale hydraulic infrastructures as symbols of state’s
progress. In virtually all countries, the view that large-scale projects are symbols of national progress
can be found. For instance, Jawaharlal Nehru, the Indian prime minister at the time, described dams
built in India as “the new temples of India” [26] (p. 33). Likewise, Kaika [27] shows how the Marathon
dam is portrayed as a symbol of modernized and westernized Athens in Greece. Furthermore, states
often name their large dams, reservoir lakes, irrigation systems after their influential national figures.
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For example, the reservoir lake of the High Aswan Dam was named after Gamal Abdul Nasser in
Egypt. In Syria, the reservoir lake of the largest Al-Tabqa Dam was named as Asad Lake. Similarly,
the crown project of the GAP was named as the Ataturk Dam, and one of the largest dams in Jordan is
named after late King Talal of Jordan. Such symbolism is also carried through visuals. For instance,
many countries across the world put dam sites on their banknotes to enhance such symbolism. It is
also worth noting that such symbolism also improves state’s symbolic power, thereby it becomes a
useful propaganda tool to strengthen its authority [11].
Concerning the role of extensive hydraulic development justified via hydraulic mission and states’
economic, social, and political power, it is evident that hydraulic works play a vital role. As Meehan
bluntly states, hydraulic works are “wellsprings of state power” [28] (p. 215). However, it would be
misleading to consider hydraulic works as mere tools for socio-economic welfare of the country. In fact,
technological advances in the early 20th century made possible to utilize water for different purposes
such as increasing agricultural product via irrigation, generating alternative energy via hydropower
generation and utilizing water to meet industrial and domestic needs.
Apart from these material benefits to socio-economic welfare, hydraulic works are also seen
as strategic tools to enhance states’ social and political power. In Wittfogel’s pioneering study,
Oriental Despotism (1957), the relationship between extensive hydraulic development and control
and the foundation of authoritarian states constitutes the backbone of Wittfogel’s thesis [29].
Accordingly, establishing large-scale flood control systems and irrigation networks, necessarily
requires centralized-despotic and strong state-structures. Wittfogel’s thesis was debated and it was
challenged by later works since counter-examples are presented by these studies undermining the
causal relationship between large-scale hydraulic works and emergence of strong states [30]. Yet, it is
safe to say that examples can be found both in the past and present states, in which water resource
development played a vital role in centralization of power and state-making processes. A wide
range of academic works from different empirical contexts confirm the view that hydraulic works
are important assets for states’ authority over territory under their control and people within [31–33].
States establish strong water bureaucracies (hydraucracies), which are important elements of state
making processes and centralization of power [34]. During this process of the hydraulic mission as a
prevailing paradigm, centralization and bureaucratization in water resource development feed one
another [35]. Furthermore, in many cases, extensive hydraulic development is not only considered
as a recipe for socio-economic development, but it may be strategically linked with domestic matters
such as secessionist aspirations. Empirical examples can be found in Turkey and Spain in which the
state elites consider large-scale hydraulic development to curb ethnic secessionist aspirations to keep
the territorial integrity of states [2,4,36]. Furthermore, large-scale hydraulic development projects are
also portrayed as the progress of the state thereby helping to galvanize state’s symbolic power [18].
As mentioned previously, portraying large-scale dams as symbols of national progress is one of the
important elements of the hydraulic mission. Even though hydraulic mission has lost its attraction in
developed countries, the appeal of building large-scale hydraulic infrastructures retains its symbolic
value among developing countries in the world [37,38].
The latest research by Obertreis et al. [39] revisit and take Wittfogel’s thesis further by investigating
how new ways of conceptualising water, infrastructure, and rule can raise understandings of their
interplay and interactions. For Obertreis et al. 2016, “it is only on the basis of the state-of-the-art on how
water, infrastructure and political rule are understood today that it is possible to appreciate what new
avenues of connectivity between them can be revealed and what fresh insights this can bring” (p. 169).
It is also worth noting that the hydraulic mission does not only inform water nationalism, but it also
strongly influences securitization of water resource development at the domestic level. Those states
where hydraulic mission is a prevailing paradigm, state elites tend to give utmost priority to their
hydraulic development in the context of the hydraulic mission. Therefore, where the hydraulic mission
is a dominant paradigm, water resource development projects are often put beyond the political debate
in which classical haggling process occur among a variety of interest groups, but in such contexts
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these projects are “securitized”. When the issue is securitized, “the issue is presented as an existential
threat, requiring emergency measures and justifying actions outside the normal bounds of political
procedure” [40] (p. 24). Therefore, the Securitization Theory developed by the Copenhagen School is
extensively used by the body of scholarly literature concerning water politics [41–43]. Especially in the
Middle East and North Africa (MENA) region where hydraulic mission continues to be a prevailing
paradigm, water resource development is often securitized by the ruling elites given the importance of
water resources in the MENA region [44]. A concept linked to securitization is “de-securitization”,
which implies that issues are moved back to the ordinary public sphere and out of the threat-defense
sequence, in which they are phrased as threats against which countermeasures are needed. Instead,
the concept of a-securitization relates to the technicalization of issues and projects [45,46].
2.2. International Dimension of the Hydraulic Mission
The hydraulic mission and the related concepts of water nationalism and securitization are
discursive processes that occur mainly at the domestic level. However, the hydraulic mission also
drives states to conduct extensive hydraulic projects strongly influencing the transboundary water
policies of those states at the international level. As Allouche [9] convincingly shows in his framework
of Water Nationalism, hydraulic mission often leads to unilateral development at the domestic level,
which often leads conflict-prone relations at the transboundary level. In other words, when riparian
states pursue their “national hydraulic missions” at the domestic level, it also strongly influences
inter-riparian relations at the transboundary level [19] (p. 91). However, the impact of the hydraulic
mission at the domestic level is not the only way in which the hydraulic mission influences the
international level. As the empirical cases will show, the state elites may use their hydraulic mission
as a foreign policy tool to increase their influential capacity at the international level. Even though
the previous aspect of hydraulic mission abroad is researched extensively, relatively fewer studies
systematically focused on this aspect. This aspect of hydraulic mission abroad can be conceptualized
in the following ways. First, state elites may portray their large-scale hydraulic projects as symbols
of their independence and self-determination. For instance, in his seminal work, Menga [18] shows
how Tajik ruling elites portrayed the giant Rogun Dam project as a symbol to enhance state ideology
and nation-making. On looking at the Rogun Dam case, Emomali Rahmon, the president of Tajikistan,
claims the dam will enable “our beloved Tajikistan to take its rightful place among developed countries
of the world” [18] (p. 485). Likewise, considering the construction of the Grand Renaissance Dam
(GERD) in the Nile, the Ethiopian ruling elites consider the project as a matter of self-determination
despite the criticisms from the downstream Egypt [12]. In a similar vein, the prominent leaders of the
post-colonial world such as Gamal Abdel Nasser of Egypt and Kwame Nkrumah of Ghana launched
large-scale dams in the context of their hydraulic mission, and they portrayed these projects as symbols
“shedding the colonial past” [47] (p. 11).Therefore, it emerges in many empirical contexts that the
hydraulic mission is portrayed as a symbol of nations’ self-determination that feeds nation-making
and securitizes water resource development.
Moreover, drawing upon the Securitization Theory developed by the Copenhagen School [48],
Warner argues that the perception of an existential threat and the defence mechanisms to overcome
such a threat is not the only driver for state elites to securitize a certain issue [49]. This can be labelled
as “the First-Order goals” [50] (p. 215). Warner contends that if an actor sees an opportunity to achieve
higher goals, the opportunity logic becomes a governing behaviour. Therefore, “security risk is not just
a ‘threat’ (inspired by fear) but also an ‘opportunity’ (inspired by desire)” [51] (p. 10). Warner labels it
as “opportunitisation”. As actors seek to realize the first-order of security goals including protection,
physical integrity, political legitimacy, self-sufficiency via securitization, the power asymmetry, and the
political context might enable them to realize the “Second-order of Security goals” such as military
expansion, power influence, further wealth and development via opportunitisation. As in the case
of securitization, an actor may employ extraordinary measures in the context of opportunitisation.
Therefore, securitization and opportunitisation are the flip side of the same coin [50]. The concept of
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opportunitisation has explanatory power in understanding the rationale behind the behaviour of the
upstream riparian states that introduce extensive hydraulic development projects in transboundary
water settings. It can be argued that if the geographical and hydrological advantage of the upstream
riparian state is supported by its material capacity (having technical expertise and economic strength,
having military ability to repel possible military threats from the other actors), the upstream state
might consider such an advantage as a useful tool to increase its capacity to influence at the regional
level. However, this does not necessarily mean that the logic of securitization is not at work at all in
such cases. While the logic of securitization can be identified within the hydraulic mission at home,
the logic of opportunitisation is at work within the hydraulic mission abroad.
Finally, states having the high-level technical expertise, economic strength and regional and global
political influence might consider their extensive hydraulic development projects as strategic tools to
enhance their influential capacity. In such cases, the hydraulic mission becomes a foreign policy tool for
those states to strengthen their capacity to influence at the regional or even global levels. For instance,
during the Cold War the US actively exported its TVA to developing countries across the world [52].
During this period, the US Bureau of Reclamation became the primary agency which built dams across
the world during the 20th century. The bureau conducted active missions in more than 50 countries,
and it provided technical expertise in more than 100 countries across the world [53]. Sneddon argues
that two main factors drive the US hydraulic aid towards “developing” nation states. First, exporting
the hydraulic development in “developing” the world was considered as an effective strategy to curb
the Soviet expansionism. Second, exporting the hydraulic development via the Bureau was regarded
as an essential tool to extend US global economic and political hegemony [53].
In addition, large-scale hydraulic works were also popular in the Soviet Union. According to this
view, scarce resources could be efficiently utilized via large-scale technologies that help enhance the
political and cultural progress of the working class. Developing these large-scale technologies is driven by
two main concerns: growing interests in mass production and gigantomania (obsession to build large-scale
infrastructures) that displays Soviet technological advances [54]. Therefore, during the initial period of
the Soviet Union, developing large-scale hydraulic infrastructures, such as giant dams in great rivers
(the Don, Volga, Dnieper), extensive irrigation systems in arid and semi-arid regions located in Central
Asia, were the significant features of this large-scale technological development [55]. After the Khrushchev
period, the Soviet-style hydraulic mission became a foreign policy tool for the “peaceful transition” to
socialism. Therefore, it became a strategic tool to enhance Soviet influence in newly founded states
primarily in Africa and the Middle East [56]. For instance, the Soviet Union became the donor country
in building the High Aswan Dam during this period [57]. Likewise, the Soviet-style of water resource
development including giant dams and irrigation systems were adopted in Syria [58]. Considering global
water policies informed by the hydraulic mission both in the US and the Soviet Union, those policies in
security terms, discussed above, include both patterns of securitization and opportunitisation. Whereas
dynamics of securitization is at work to curb the socio-political influence of the other party in the context
of the Cold War, the dynamics of opportunitisation and what Zeitoun labels “the third order goals”
(imposing the hydraulic mission at the global level) are also at work [50] (p. 216).
However, there is a difference between portraying a particular international water initiative as
a symbol of peace and stability, and successfully implementing it. As shown in the next sections
by the empirical cases, the following factors play a key role in determining success or failure of
implementation of international water initiatives. First, power plays an important role. In fact,
as the extensive body of the literature concerning hydro-hegemony demonstrates, it is the power
relations that largely determines “who gets what” in hydropolitics [59]. Second, as Hussein and
Grandi [14] show, political dynamics and the broader political context should also be taken into
consideration to understand why certain water initiatives failed whereas others were successfully
implemented. Finally, there might be certain technical and economic hurdles, which might prevent
implementation of those international water initiatives.
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To sum up, the hydraulic mission does not only support and call for extensive hydraulic
development to ensure states’ authority and influence at the domestic level, but it can also be considered
as a tool to increase states’ influence at the international level. While dynamics of securitization are at
work in the former case, the dynamics of opportunitisation are at work in the latter one. As the case
studies examined in the next sections will show, the Turkish context provides a rich empirical example.
3. Understanding Turkey’s Hydraulic Mission Abroad
This section deploys the concepts of hydraulic mission at home and hydraulic mission
abroad—which were discussed in Section 2 to analyse three empirical case studies to understand
Turkey’s hydraulic mission abroad. These three case studies were either proposed, but failed,
or successfully conducted water initiatives since the 1980s. However, it is necessary to contextualize
them within the broader geopolitical context.
Throughout most of the Cold War period, the dynamics of the Cold War and Turkey’s avoidance
from being part of the Middle East politics has shaped Turkey’s foreign policy towards the Middle
East [60]. Neutrality in inter-Arab disputes and Arab-Israeli conflict avoidance from being part
of unstable dynamics of the Middle East politics, maintaining the status-quo and avoiding from
connecting its Middle East policy with its Western alliances (in order not be viewed as a “Trojan
Horse of the western states” in the region) have constituted the central tenets of Turkey’s Middle East
policy [61]. Even though deviations from this policy approach can be identified in the particular time
periods, this low-profile approach constituted the main essence of Turkey’s Middle East policy.
In the context of the geopolitical transformations in the 1980s, the Turkish ruling elites had to
reassess Turkey’s security needs, which led to adopting a more assertive approach in Turkey’s Middle
East politics. Turkey’s more assertive stance in Middle East affairs was not only driven by its changing
threat perceptions, but it is also driven by the new opportunities. During his two-term tenure as Prime
Minister between 1983 and 1989 and president until his death in 1993, Turgut Ozal was the architect of
this view. Ozal argued that Turkey must depart from its low-profile foreign policy and it must establish
good relations with its neighbouring countries in the Middle East. Turkey’s active engagement with
these countries, Ozal argues, would also transform Turkey as a bridge between the West and the Middle
East [61]. In the context of this policy change, several water initiatives, including attempts to ease the
tense relations with Syria concerning the Euphrates and Tigris Dispute, water pipeline initiatives were
proposed by Turkey. By the end of the Cold War and onwards, the political development in the Middle
East forced Turkey to prioritize the Middle East in its external relations. It is evident that after the
Justice and Development Party (AKP, Turkish acronym) came to power, Ozal’s legacy is carried by the
AKP. In the similar line with Ozal’s foreign policy doctrine, Turkey’s Middle East policy in the AKP
era is based upon two main pillars; strengthening political relations with the neighbouring countries,
also labelled as zero-problem policy formulated by Ahmet Davutoglu, the former Turkish foreign then
prime minister and acting as a mediator to resolve the existing conflicts [62]. Therefore, it is evident
that Turkey’s water initiatives have been considered as a foreign policy tool to enhance cooperation
and Turkey’s influential capacity in the region since the 1980s.
3.1. Opportunitizing the GAP: Understanding its International Dimension
The GAP is one of the largest regional development projects of its kind in the world based
on extensive hydraulic development. The project consists of building 22 dams and 19 hydropower
plants on the Euphrates and Tigris basin and it seeks to irrigate 1.693027 ha of land. The GAP is the
greatest public investment initiative ever conducted by the Turkish governments in the history of
Turkey. The project area corresponds to approximately 10% of Turkey’s total surface area, as well as its
population [63,64]. Concerning the international dimension of the GAP, the project provided Turkey
a strategic advantage in the region owing to following reasons. First, Turkey, by being an upstream
riparian state of the Euphrates and Tigris basin, enjoys a pivotal position, since approximately 75% of
the entire watershed originates within the Turkish territory [65]. These geographical and hydrological
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facts provide Turkey a strategic advantage in the basin. Second, Turkey has a considerable economic
capacity and technical expertise regarding the hydraulic development, enabling her to finance and
built large-scale hydraulic infrastructures. Apart from its resources, the Turkish government was able
to secure international funds by using its political alliances in the past [66]. Recently, privatisation
has become another attractive model for Turkey to finance the hydraulic development projects [67].
Third, Turkey has considerable military power along with its strategic alliance with the North Atlantic
Treaty Organization (NATO). Therefore, downstream riparian states were unable to deter Turkey from
building, carrying on the GAP. As Ahmet Davutoglu, the former Turkish Prime Minister argues in
his prominent book, Strategic Depth [68], Turkey has a supreme geopolitical and military advantage
vis-a-vis Syria. Therefore, Syria cannot risk an armed conflict in the Euphrates and Tigris basin.
Similar assessment can be made between Turkey and Iraq. Given Turkey’s great military might along
with its strategic alliance with the NATO, risking a war for water or using bellicose statements are
not viable options for Iraq either. Finally, Turkey’s bargaining position has also increased due to the
de-stabilization in Iraq, and thereafter in Syria, since the 1980s. Since Iraq was preoccupied with a series
of armed conflicts (Iran-Iraq War, Invasion of Kuwait followed by the UN intervention, the US invasion),
it was only Syria that sought to balance Turkey’s water development attempts in the Euphrates and
Tigris basin. While Iraq never returned to political stability after the US invasion, Syria also descended
into chaos in the Arab Spring process [69,70]. Apart from geopolitical and strategic advantages,
the GAP would also provide Turkey a strategic position in the region. Dursun Yildiz, a former
high-ranking DSI official and the head of the Hydropolitics Academy, emphasizes the enormous
reservoir capacity which Turkey would reach upon the completion of the GAP [71]. According to
Yildiz the GAP would provide Turkey a strategic advantage in the region as Turkey can control the
pivotal waters of the Euphrates and Tigris basin. He further argues that economic benefits gained
through the GAP would enhance Turkey’s influence in the Middle East, since Turkey would gain
significant socio-economic benefits via the GAP [72]. Likewise, the official report, the Survey on
Socio-Economic Development Levels of Provinces and Regions (2003), published by the State Planning
Agency, shows that the Southeastern Anatolian region continues to be one of the least developed
regions in terms of socio-economic development indices, as the Figure 1, below, illustrates in the
report below.
Figure 1. The Socio-economic development indexes in Turkey according to region [73].
In this regard, the report also argues that socio-economic backwardness of the region is the main
reason behind the immigration from the region. The report also states that the GAP would reverse
this population movement by expanding irrigated agricultural fields, and by galvanizing agro-based
industrial development in the region [73].
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It is also worth noting that the progress of the GAP has entered a new stage by 2000 and onwards
owing to changes both internally and externally. Internally, after the AKP came to power in 2002,
infrastructural development, such as building motorways, bridges, and dams have become a main
strategy to retain the popular support to the ruling party. Turkey’s good economic performance
in this period would enable the government to allocate more financial resources to revitalize the
GAP, which had slowed down during the 1990s. As the AKP government further accelerated the
privatisation in water resource development, which started by the 1980s and continued onwards [74].
The growing involvement of the private sector and international capital in dam building in the world
also provided an ample opportunity to the government for financing large hydraulic works in the GAP
without draining its public resources. Externally, Turkey has faced no considerable challenges from the
downstream riparian states due to the following reasons. As stated above Iraq and Syria had to deal
with political struggles at the domestic level. Furthermore, Turkey has been able to continue the GAP
in spite of the downstream activities to curb the project during the 1980s and 1990s. Therefore, some of
the large-scale hydraulic infrastructures had already been realized in this period. The completed
infrastructures have enabled further leverage to the Turkish government, and they have significantly
increased their capacity to influence in the Euphrates and Tigris basin. For instance, considering the
recent memoranda of understanding (MoU) signed between Turkey and Syria on water issues, it is
safe to say that the Turkish government was able to impose its official position in these documents [10].
Therefore, the opportunitisation logic is at work at the international level along with the securitisation
logic at the domestic level in the GAP project.
However, Turkey’s hydraulic mission in the Euphrates and Tigris basin has certain limits.
The Turkish government regards water as a catalyst for cooperation rather than a source of
conflict” (Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 2018). However, Turkey’s hydraulic endeavours in the Euphrates
and Tigris basin were considered as a significant threat by the downstream riparian states. Here,
perceived identities played a vital role. For instance, according Baathist elites in Syria, Turkey does not
pursue its policies but the policies of the foreign powers, primarily Israel and the US. In other words,
Turkey is acting as a proxy agent of the West and using water to deprive its Arab neighbours [75].
Therefore, the downstream riparian states, Syria and Iraq, adopted variety of counter bargaining
power strategies, given that military solution is not an option for the downstream riparian countries.
These strategies include curbing the international financing for the project, making indirect alliances
with armed groups such as the PKK in Turkey, formal protests and official notes during bilateral and
trilateral negotiations concerning water issues [76]. In such a political context, the Turkish proposals,
such as the Three-Stage Plan, which prospected inventory studies on land and water for each riparian
state, were rejected by the downstream riparian states [77]. Therefore, the GAP is regarded as an
existential threat by the downstream riparian states, which would enable Turkey to establish a regional
hegemony in spite of Turkey’s attempts to portray the project as a source of prosperity for the region.
3.2. Water Exports Initiatives to the Middle East: Using Water as a Foreign Policy Tool
As discussed in Section 2.1, the dynamics of opportunitisation are not only at work at the
transboundary water settings. In fact, when states acquire more technical expertise, political influence,
and economic strengths, they might begin to introduce international water initiatives to extend their
influence regionally and globally. In this regard, the Turkish governments have introduced several
regional water initiatives in the Middle East during the 1980s and 1990s. These water initiatives,
aiming at exporting large amounts of water from Turkey to the Middle East, were in line with Turkey’s
Middle East policy of the 1980s. This article argues that as Turkey has adopted a more proactive
involvement in the Middle East political affairs since the 1980s, these proposed water transfer projects
were considered by the Turkish governments as effective strategic tools to increase its influence at the
regional level.
One of the overarching rationales behind Turkey’s great hydraulic mission stems from the
geographical, hydrological and climatic necessities. Eroglu, the minister of the Forestry and Water
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Affairs, has stated that since there are high-level seasonal fluctuations in Turkey’s rivers, it is imperative
for Turkey to increase its reservoir capacity [78]. Furthermore, Turkey’s water resources are also
unevenly distributed. In other words, while there is water abundance in particular regions, there are
water shortages in others. Water transfer projects are the primary solutions for this problem, which were
applied in particularly highly populated areas, such as Istanbul and Ankara [79]. In this regard,
Turkey’s Mediterranean region located in the southern part of the country enjoys relatively abundant
water. To utilize this water potential in the region, The Turkish government has introduced extensive
water transfer projects both at the regional level.
Water transfer projects via pipelines from Turkey’s southern regions to the Middle East is the
first international water initiatives proposed by the Turkish government. Utilizing water surplus
in the southern part of Turkey to abroad has a longer past, which can be traced back to late 1980s.
The Turkish government introduced numbers of water transfer projects to use water as a strategic
tool in its diplomacy in the Middle East. The first water transfer project proposed by the Turkish
government in 1986 was the Peace Pipeline Project. The project prospected transferring a significant
amount of water resources from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers located in Southern Turkey to the
Middle East [80]. According to the plan, approximately 10 million cubic meters of water per day would
be transferred from the Seyhan and Ceyhan rivers to the Middle East via two pipelines. While the
route of the first pipeline (the Western Pipeline) would supply water to major cities including Aleppo,
Hama, Homs, Amman, Medina, and Jeddah, the second pipeline (the Gulf Pipeline) would have used
the same route with the Trans-Arab Oil Pipeline. It would have provided water to Gulf countries [81].
The total cost of the Western and the Gulf Pipelines were estimated to be $8 billion USD and $12 billion
USD, respectively [82]. The peace pipeline project can be seen as a strategic tool which would enable
Turkey to play a more active role in the Middle East.
However, while the domestic initiatives were completed successfully, the international water
initiatives to the Middle East were failed. Turkish proposal was rejected by the oil-rich Gulf States.
Both economic and political factors played a role in the rejection of the Turkish plan. About financial
matters, the recipient countries argued that the total cost of the projects is too much considering the
benefits. They also argued installing desalination plants rather than a pipeline is a much cheaper
option for the oil-rich Gulf States since they do not have to be worried about the energy costs for
these plants. As Gruen [83] points out the pipeline would create another Upstream vs. Downstream
situations in the region thereby those states located in the downstream reaches of the pipeline will be
much more vulnerable in the case of possible water disruptions of the upstream water flow. Given
that Turkey already enjoys a pivotal position in the Euphrates and Tigris basin, the pipeline would
provide further leverage to Turkey. Thus, public campaigns were waged that claimed to curb the plan.
Bilen [82] states that those against the pipeline project claimed that Turkey seeks to revive the Ottoman
Empire in the Middle East, and it aims to establish hegemony by using water. Finally, Gruen [83] also
showed that some experts also questioned the seriousness of the Turkish proposal in the first place.
They argue that the project seeks to deflect the criticisms levelled at Turkey regarding its extensive
upstream development in the Euphrates and Tigris basin.
Therefore, the project was never materialized. After the first project was rejected, the Turkish
government proposed a more modest pipeline plan. The new plan was basically proposing a shorter
pipeline which would end in Jordan by passing through Syria. The annual amount of water being
transferred from Turkey to Jordan estimated to be 2.19 billion cubic meters per year. The Turkish
experts argue that the project would significantly remedy water shortages of Jordan and Palestine,
thereby contributing to the peace and stability in the region [82]. However, this project was also never
materialized due to the similar economic and political concerns stated above. These failed attempts
show that in spite of the persistent labelling of these projects as catalyst for peace in the Middle
East by the Turkish ruling elites, there are political, economic, and technical limitations of Turkey’s
hydraulic mission abroad. To understand why these projects never materialized, it is necessary to draw
from theories of power and broader political context. As shown by Hussein and Grandi [13,14]. It is
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necessary to consider power asymmetries within the broader political context in order to understand
why certain regional projects are successful and others fail. If a country, for instance Turkey, aims
at having these initiatives to be successful, it would need power and the relevant political context
combined together. Only in that case such projects can result to be successful. Powerful countries
would use water to get more power and non-powerful ones use power to get more water, which may
allow them to gain more economic power. Countries also need the power to be able to use such
initiatives; hence, it is necessary to consider the broader political context to understand when and how
countries can use water to further enhance their power. The empirical cases in this article confirm this.
Even though Turkey’s water plans regarding the Middle East failed in the 1980s and the early
1990s, the Turkish ruling elites continued to consider the water surplus in its Mediterranean region
as a foreign policy tool in its relations with Middle Eastern countries. In the second half of the 1990s,
Turkey’s relations with Arab countries, primarily with Syria, deteriorated mainly owing to water
disputes in the Euphrates and Tigris and Syria’s active support to the separatist movements in Turkey.
Particularly, the Syrian government was the primary supporter of the PKK during the 1980s and
1990s [84]. The worsening relations between Turkey and Syria brought the two states on the verge of
war in Ocalan Crisis in 1998 [85]. In this political environment, Turkey sought to strengthen political ties
with Israel and the two countries realized cooperation in the military field [86]. The Israeli government
also showed its interests in purchasing water from the Manavgat River, located in the southern part of
Turkey. After a round of talks between 2002 and 2004, the Turkish and Israeli government signed a
deal on water purchase from the Manavgat River. According to the agreement, Israel would purchase
50 billion cubic meters of water annually from the Manavgat River. Ugur Ziyal, the deputy minister
of Foreign Affairs who signed the deal, stated that the agreement has particular importance in the
Turkish-Israeli relations and it may also be a cooperation model for other countries in the region.
His Israeli counterpart, Yoav Biran, also emphasized the strategic, political and diplomatic importance
of the deal [87]. Namık Tan, the spokesperson of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs at the time stated the
Turkish-Israeli deal would contribute to promoting peace and stability in the Middle East [88]. In the
same vein, Mithat Rende, the retired Turkish diplomat who served as the deputy head of Environment
and Water division in the ministry of Foreign Affairs, stated that “Turkey’s unused waters flowing into
the Mediterranean” would de-escalate tense relations on water in the region, and the deal will help
creation of comprehensive and durable cooperation in the region [81] (p. 170).
However, even though an agreement was signed this time, once again political and economic
matters did not allow the implementation of the Turkish-Israeli water deal. Concerning economic
reasons, the rise of oil prices significantly increased the transportation costs. Moreover, it became also
clear that the water cannot be carried via oil tanks since it will decrease the water quality. Building
specific tanks for carrying water meant further costs. In the press release published by the Turkish
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, it is stated that even though the deal was suspended, Turkish government
would continue to negotiate with the potential new buyers from the Middle East for possible water
transfer projects after the privatization of the water facilities in the Manavgat River [89]. Furthermore,
Turkey’s reliability as a water exporter was also put on a question in the Israeli side. These concerns
further increased after the AKP came to power in Turkey, which vehemently criticizes policies of Israel.
Thus, the relations between the two countries have notably worsened in the following periods. After
the flotilla crisis in 2010, the Turkish government decided to suspend all the ongoing joint projects with
Israel. Diplomatic ties were almost broken between the two parties. Therefore, the Turkish government
declared that it has no intention re-vitalize a similar water deal with Israel soon [90].
This section shows that since Turkey’s involvement in Middle Eastern affairs have gradually
increased by the 1980s and onwards, the Turkish ruling elites have considered Turkey’s strategic
hydraulic advantage in the region accompanied by growing economic and engineering capacity as
a tool to enhance Turkey’s influential capacity in the region. Therefore, a variety of water initiatives
have been adopted since the 1980s. However, these initiatives were failed as the recipient countries
have rejected Turkey’s proposals due to the political, economic and technical reasons. Concerning
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political factors, the mutual distrust between the countries in the Middle East created a big obstacle.
Therefore, even though these initiatives were promoted as a catalyst for peace by the Turkish elites,
it was perceived as an attempt to establish a regional hegemony by using water.
Furthermore, the proposed pipeline was supposed to pass through a number of countries,
which creates other upstream-downstream dichotomies among the states as in the case of
transboundary watersheds. Finally, as it can be seen in the context of Turkish-Syrian and Turkish-Israeli
relations in the different time periods, the bilateral relations rapidly change in the region. In other
words, the political relations are also as erratic as the watersheds in the Middle East. Such an
unstable political context also created another obstacle for realization of these initiatives. Concerning
the economic factors, large sums of money had to be allocated to realize such an extensive water
transfer project. Notably, the Gulf States having enormous energy resources found constructing
desalinization plants as more feasible and less politically risky. Therefore, they preferred to increase
their desalinization capacity to remedy their water shortages. Finally, the project has not been found
technically feasible, which can never be realized by the recipient countries. Turkey’s water export
initiatives since the 1980s show that in the line Turkey’s changing perception to the Middle East in its
foreign policy, the Turkish ruling elites began to consider Turkey’s hydraulic mission as a useful tool to
increase its political influence at the regional level. However, as indicated at the beginning, the failed
attempts also show limits of Turkey’s hydraulic mission as a foreign policy tool.
3.3. The Peace Water Project: An Attempt to Establish a Pax Aquarrum
As stated above, after the AKP came to power in 2002, it has pursued Ozal’s foreign policy
doctrine in the regional affairs. Thus, despite the failures of the previous water initiatives, the Turkish
government continued to develop similar water transfer projects. In this vein, the most recent,
and perhaps the most ambitious, water transfer project conducted by the Turkish government is the
Water Transfer Project from Turkey to Cyprus, also known as the Peace Water Project.
Unlike the previous water initiatives, the recipient state of the Peace Water Project is Cyprus not
the countries in the Middle East. As the following empirical evidence suggests, the similar logic of
enhancing Turkey’s regional influence constitutes the main political rationale in the Peace Water Project.
Moreover, looking at the empirical evidence, it is safe to argue that the Turkish ruling elites considered
the Peace Water Project as the first phase of the upcoming water transfer projects that would extend
the pipeline beyond Cyprus, primarily to the Middle East. When we examine the bilateral framework
agreement between Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) concerning the
project, it is stated that “the Turkish government—without abandoning its responsibilities derived from
this agreement—retains its right to sell water to the third-party country or countries”[91] (Article 2).
In the same vein with Article 2 of the Framework Agreement signed between Turkey and the TRNC,
the Turkish officials already revealed that “the Peace Water Project” can be extended to the Middle
East. For instance, in his recent visit to Jordan, it was reported that President Erdogan has already
offered to his Jordanian counterpart, King Abdullah, to extend “the Peace Water Project” by building
a second pipeline from Cyprus to Jordan [92]. Likewise, Tugrul Turkes, the former deputy prime
minister, stated that “Hopefully, we can give this water to the Greek side afterwards. Israel also needs
water. We can give it there too” [93]. These statements show that the Turkish elites do not only consider
the Peace Water Project as a unique water transfer project on its own to remedy the chronic water
problem of the TRNC, but they also view it as a part of the broader political agenda; in other words,
the perspective of using water as a strategic instrument to increase regional influence persists.
To tackle the problem of water scarcity in the TRNC, the Turkish government introduced the Peace
Water Project, which would transfer water from Turkey’s south to Cyprus. The project consists of three
elements; the construction of the Alakopru dam in the Turkish part and the canal transferring water
from the dam to the Mediterranean Sea, the construction of the 80-km long pipelines from Turkey to
Cyprus, and construction of the Gecitkoy dam in Northern Cyprus [94]. The project commenced on
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7 March 2011 with the construction of the Alakopru Dam in Southern Turkey. Despite the magnitude
of the project, it was completed swiftly by 2015 and inaugurated on 17 October 2015.
In the inauguration ceremony of the project, Mustafa Akinci, the president of the TRNC stated
that “Water has become more important than oil as the world experiences global warming. This water
will increase the production of Cyprus. Our yellow color [referring to the island’s landscape] will
return green. This type of project means building the TRNC which can stand on its own [Emphasize
added, author’s translation]” [95]. In the inauguration, Ahmet Davutoglu, the PM at the time, stressed
that the project would strengthen the ties between Turkey and Cyprus. He stated that “We are building
a water bridge between Turkey and Cyprus, the like of which has not been done before in the world
. . . Here we declare the world that Turkey and Cyprus have been intertwined together, which cannot
be separated anymore. [Author’s translation]” [95].
After the completion of the water transfer infrastructures both in Turkey and Cyprus, the DSI has
also swiftly completed the canals and water networks in the island which would bring the transferred
water to the different corners of the island. The project prospects are moving 75 million cubic meters of
water from Turkey to Cyprus per year. Roughly half of the water will be used for domestic use to meet
growing water demand in Northern Cyprus, and the other half would be allocated to irrigation [96].
With these features, the project is a unique water transfer project, the likes of which have not been
built before [97].
However, it would be misleading to consider the Peace Water Project as purely a hydraulic
infrastructure construction. It is a continuation of Turkey’s hydraulic mission beyond its borders.
As Hofmann [98] (p. 281) highlights the both unilateral water initiatives conducted in the Northern and
Southern Cyprus with the strong third party involvements cannot be understood without considering
the geopolitical context. Since the project is inherently linked with the long-standing Cyprus conflict,
it could make the resolution of the conflict even more complicated than it currently is [98]. Therefore,
the Peace Water Project does carry strong geopolitical and symbolic considerations.
According to Huseyin Gokcekus, a Turkish-Cypriot academic and the coordinator of the project
states that the project shows Turkey’s power and its progress. For Gokcekus, the project will give
Turkey a “leadership role” in future in similar projects in the region, while it will also play a vital role in
resolving acute water shortages that Cyprus experiences [99]. The project is portrayed as the “project
of the century”. Furthermore, both scholars and policy-makers emphasized the possible political
outcomes of the project. In this regard, Mehmet Hasguler, a Turkish-Cypriot academic and member of
TRNC higher education council, argues that the Peace Water Project would provide an upper hand
to the Turkish-Cypriots in negotiations for the resolution of the long-standing Cyprus conflict [100].
Hasguler [101] also argues that, as in the case of the European Coal and Steel Community experience,
the Turkish and Greek sides can realize resource-based cooperation based upon the recently discovered
hydrocarbons and water. Thus, an offer was already made to the Greek Cypriots. In the inaugural
ceremony, President Erdogan stated that “ . . . I hope entire Cyprus would benefit from this water,
which can meet the water demands of the Island, as a result of permanent and just resettlement of the
Cyprus issue [Author’s translation]” [102].
However, as in the previous water initiatives, this Turkish initiative also created problems,
and even resentment, among the recipients of the project. Unsurprisingly, the Greek Cypriots strongly
opposed to the project. The day after the project was inaugurated, Yiannakis Omirou, the former
president of the Greek-Cypriot Parliament, described the project as “a flagrant violation of international
law”. Omirou argued that the project seeks integration of the “occupied territories” to the Turkish
heartland. Therefore, the project must be condemned strongly, and the European Union and the
United Nations must condemn such actions [103]. Likewise, Michalis Lytas, the head of Greek Cypriot
Farmer’s union, states even though there is an urgent need for water, he does not trust the Turkish
motives. By referring to the old saying, he argues, “it may start as a gift . . . but eventually, they will
take your whole house” [104].
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The opposition to the project did not only come from the other side of the island but also came
from within Northern Cyprus. The political parties and non-state entities located in the far-left in
the political spectrum, environmental groups, labour unions declared their opposition to the project.
For instance, an activist from the Baraka Cultural Centre, the radical left-wing NGO, describes the
project as a “provincialisation of Cyprus” rather than integration. He opposes the idea of selling
water and the very marketisation and privatization process [105]. In a similar vein, the left-wing New
Cyprus Party (YKP, Turkish acronym) argues that just like the 1974 operation was dressed up as a
peace operation, the privatisation and marketisation of water is dressed up as “peace water” via this
project. The YKP also emphasizes environmental (the environmental impact of the whole infrastructure
built both in Turkey and Cyprus) and societal (displacement of local population in Turkey due to the
construction of the Alakopru Dam) adverse impacts of the project [106]. Thus, these groups of actors
organized a rally in Nicosia in the same day the project was inaugurated to show their opposition and
resentment for the project. These concerns and opposition from within Northern Cyprus support the
claim that the project will likely to render Northern Cyprus even more dependent on Turkey [107]
Finally, the issue of governing water resources that are brought to the island created another
issue area. After the project was completed, the issue of “who will govern water?” was disputed
between the Turkish government and the TRNC. While the provincial municipalities backed by the
Republican Turkish Party demanded administration of water that would be transferred via the project,
the Turkish government insisted that the municipalities do not have the institutional capacity to
administer the project. Therefore, the administration should be conducted by the private sector [108].
The disagreement led to tension between the Turkish government and the TRNC government [109].
Regarding the issue, the coalition government in the TRNC was also divided. Whereas the right-wing
National Union Party agreed with the Turkish government, the left-wing Republican Turkish Party
supported to municipalities. As a result, the political crisis constituted one of the core reasons behind
the collapse of the coalition government in Northern Cyprus [110]. It appears that the issue continues
to be a disputed issue area in the political agenda of Cyprus, considering the importance of water for
the Island.
4. Discussion
As discussed above, the Turkish case provides a rich empirical case study concerning the
deployment of the hydraulic mission both at home and abroad. Looking at Turkey’s both domestic
(as in the case of the GAP Project) international water initiatives in general, the paper finds that as
Turkey’s foreign policy has shifted to a more assertive stance in its regional affairs since the 1980s,
these water initiatives have also been considered as a means to enhance Turkey’s influence in the
region. Therefore, from this aspect just like the Turkish government securitized its extensive hydraulic
development program in the context of the hydraulic mission to enhance its authority at the domestic
level since the foundation of the Republic, the similar political rationale can also be found in Turkey’s
international water initiatives.
However, as the empirical evidence illustrated above shows, while some of these initiatives were
politically contested but successfully implemented, others politically contested and failed. The GAP
and the Peace Water Project to Cyprus are the water initiatives that are successfully implemented.
However, this does not necessarily mean that these projects were not politically contested. In both
cases, the projects were politically contested. In the context of the GAP, the downstream riparian states
have opposed the project from the very beginning. They have exerted certain power tactics to be able
to curb the implementation of the project during the 1980s and the 1990s. In the context of the Peace
Water Project, the issue of how to govern the water coming from Turkey was disputed between Turkey
and the TRNC government.
Furthermore, environmental and anti-privatization groups also opposed the project. Greek
Cypriots also opposed the project. However, the Turkish governments were able to implement these
two water initiatives despite these oppositions. Here, it is worth noting that both projects were
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implemented either domestically (as the case of the GAP) or quasi-domestically (as in the case of
the Peace Water Project) contexts. Therefore, the Turkish government, having political authority and
influence, economic power, and technical expertise, were able to implement these projects.
Unlike the GAP and the Peace Water Project, Turkey’s water export initiatives to the Middle
East failed. Considering the empirical evidence derived from the cases, those water initiatives were
failed due to the following reasons. First and foremost, Turkey’s political influence and authority,
economic power and technical expertise enabled her to implement these projects successfully despite
the criticisms and oppositions at the domestic and quasi-domestic structures. However, implementing
these projects that require the approval of the neighbouring states was beyond Turkey’s power grip.
Therefore, the Turkish government has been unable to impose its political agenda.
Second, ideational factors also played an important role that resulted in rejection from the recipient
states. In the eyes of Turkey’s Arab neighbours, Turkey seeks to implement its regional hegemony
by using water. Furthermore, it is also argued that Turkey does not conduct these projects on its
own. Instead, it acts as the proxy agent of western imperialism. These perceptions, whose roots can
be found in the Ottoman Empire period and the Cold War, constituted an obstacle for cooperation.
Third, the unstable political environment of the Middle East also constituted another obstacle. Just like
the water resources regimes in the Middle East, the political relationships between Turkey and its
neighbours are erratic. For instance, while the political rapprochement between Turkey and Israel
made inter-state water transfer negotiations possible between the two countries in the 1990s, as the
bilateral relations have gradually worsened in the 2000s, the deal also has never returned to their
political agenda. Fourth, the distinctive character of Middle East political dynamics also constituted an
obstacle. In the Middle East political context, it was almost impossible for Turkey to propose a water
transfer project to the Arab World and Israel at the same time. Concerning the Middle East political
context, it is also worth noting that implementation of the water pipeline from Turkey to the Middle
East means the creation of new upstream vs. downstream situations in the region. In other words,
apart from the “natural” upstream vs. downstream transboundary water settings, it would mean the
creation of artificial upstream vs. downstream conditions that often leads to conflict in the Middle
East. Fifth, economic factors also constituted an obstacle for implementation. For example, considering
the oil-rich Gulf States, desalinization is found economically more viable and politically less risky
due to the above-stated reasons. Finally, there are technical obstacles that prevent implementation
of Turkey’s proposals. For example, carrying large sums of water via tanks was found to be neither
cost-effective nor technically viable. After the Turkish-Israeli deal, it became clear that carrying fresh
water via oil tanks would significantly decrease the quality of water. Building specific tanks for water
transfer meant further costs.
Finally, the article concludes by suggesting appropriate areas for future research on the Cyprus
case. Even though the study looked at the case of the Peace Water Project as Turkey’s most recent
water initiative abroad, more in-depth studies are needed to understand the social, economic, political,
and environmental impact of the Peace Water Project in Cyprus.
5. Conclusions
This study analysed the hydraulic mission of the Turkish state both at home and abroad.
This article provided a conceptual framework that shows states having the geographical advantage,
economic power, technical capacity, and political influence may regard their extensive hydraulic
development program as a foreign policy tool. Here, the study integrated Warner’s concept of
opportunitisation into a conceptual framework concerning the hydraulic mission abroad. The study
argued that, in the context those states having more power capabilities than others, the water resource
development projects are securitized internally and opportunitised externally, which are informed by
the hydraulic mission. Therefore, these states consider their international water initiatives as foreign
policy tools to enhance their regional, or even global, influence.
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The analysis of the hydraulic mission abroad in the case of Turkey investigated the following
three cases: The Southeastern Anatolian Project (GAP), the Water Export Initiatives to the Middle
East, and the Water Transfer Project to Cyprus, namely the Peace Water Project. Being informed by
an in-depth investigation of those three case studies, this study showed that ambitious hydraulic
development projects conducted by the Turkish government do not only serve to keep peace and
stability at the domestic level, but they are also strategic tools to enhance Turkey’s influence abroad.
However, this study also showed the necessity to consider power asymmetries and the role of the
broader political context to understand why such initiatives abroad are successful or fail.
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